That’s fucking adorable.
No, they’ll tax you back into work.
What are you gonna do, shoot them?
Since this paper was written, this situation has gone from atrocious to dire.
This should be your reaction.
If you understand keywords like this.
The Commission study points to ageing-induced fiscal burdens equal to an increase of infinite horizon budgetary cost of more than 4% of GDP for over half of the euro area countries, reaching around 8% for some countries. The conversion of these flow data into a net present value at a discount rate of 5% yields burdens for the euro area of 174% of GDP in 2005. A lower discount rate of 3% increases this figure even further, to 217% of GDP (Table 2).
It concludes, blithely.
From a user’s point of view, there is a need for statisticians and national accountants to provide comprehensive data on pension obligations,
Look at all this money we won’t have!
especially those of general government, and they should be compiled based on SNA standards. This means no change in current standards for the treatment of pension schemes in the core accounts. As discussed, however, there are plans to compile a supplementary table on pensions, covering the details of pension flows and stocks recorded in the core national accounts, but also including those that are not covered. Thus, a complete view of household pension “assets” will be provided. It is obvious that the ageing of the population in Europe makes structural reforms necessary.
Obvious you’re getting something of nothing.
In this context, the financing of future pension expenditures and pension entitlements may need to be reviewed.
The new supplementary table on all social insurance pension schemes will provide better information, and will allow consistent comparisons between private and general government pension schemes, as well as coherent assessments of policy adjustments. The table will also show that the predominant, general government-sponsored (unfunded, defined benefit) pension schemes in Europe will lead to increasing general government expenditure and debt if no structural reforms take place. Policy solutions aside, implicit general government obligations from pension systems are very large for many European countries. The consequences for countries differ, mainly reflecting different demographic prospects and pension arrangements.
And who will suffer those consequences?
The order of magnitude of upcoming fiscal burdens is high, even if estimates are sensitive to underlying assumptions on factors such as discount rate and wage growth.
Best case scenario: slightly less fucked.
From a methodological perspective, estimating general government pension obligations generally requires detailed country-specific data on contribution and benefit arrangements. Therefore, ongoing work is being conducted to generate consistent estimates and, based on these data, homogeneous projections for a large set of countries.
translation: Even we don’t know how fucked we are, to be honest. We don’t know who’s giving what, when, what’s due, when, we can’t estimate anything, and we assume Europe will be homogeneous in any way whatsoever.
This was before Turkey joined.