Globalisation tanked Western wages, birth rates

Duh? Nothing to do with women, who always worked. That was a false flag by Peterson, who curiously didn’t show any data (because that data does not exist). Women always worked, even in pre-industry, except the royalty and certain aristocrats. That is nowhere near most women, let alone all.
Contrary to Peterson’s nagging, Western incomes are still high internationally, so what would explain the 60s-00s replacement of the working class, but globalisation broadly and international competition from mass immigration locally? Naturally his lefty politics won’t allow him to finger the true culprit because that raises uncomfortable questions for his age group.

keep up the white guilt, clearly!
For example, how the World we bred will be fed as white people die out.

Missionaries violated the Bible by giving gibs to heathens, as in ‘those who will not work, shall not eat’.
https://www.worlddata.info/average-income.php
But y’know, that’s just actually looking for the DATA.

UK average income $42k.
Meanwhile places with an intact culture (relatively) and plausibly more K-family units (read: high marriage rates) have super low incomes and larger families as the norm still.
e.g.
Poland $15.2k
Croatia $14.9k
Russia $11.2k
Serbia $16.1k
Hungary $7k
since you all have such a hard-on for the EE nations

so it’s a blatant FALLACY to conflate income with family formation in white people

with ONGOING data to prove it decisively (no muh 21st century is different)

losers: “it’s all about the money! that’s why women don’t want me!” sure

and population has gone up steadily e.g. Russia.
https://www.worlddata.info/europe/russia/populationgrowth.php
The data is out there but the fake redpill refuse to admit immigration is the problem and always has been (because literally most of them are immigrants, Magic Dirt men playing hello fellow white man). They wish to foment mutual white hatred (r-select impulse, the spiteful mutant) and what are the two biggest demographics in any race? Men v. women. Men stop protecting the women, women are easy prey. Divide, conquer. Cowardly but dysgenic.

The rise of the East has killed the West and the traditional breeding stock of the working class.
Globalisation kills.
Blaming the in-group is what the Globalists want, it produces further sterility and prevents you from questioning them (political triangulation), see: SJWs salivating over causing a gender war and larping as white women when they aren’t (religiously).

Did women get the vote in 1995, ya morons?

FFS pay attention

example of this all with EE nations again:

this took me five minutes to research, what is Peterson’s excuse?

Poland has one of the lowest birth rates in the EU (as covered before, the r-women don’t want kids when asked)
but even their population has been holding steady despite emigration and low incomes
.
https://www.worlddata.info/europe/poland/populationgrowth.php
Blaming ‘women’ for working is plain ignorant of history! Did they think their grandmothers all twiddled their thumbs?
What would they prefer? Living on welfare? Starving? Working until their eggs are all gone? Those are the only options, all demographic death. Women cannot fix this and shouldn’t be blamed for it. At some point they need to man up and admit men need to correct the ‘mistakes’ of their forefathers i.e. globalisation, immigration, multiculturalism.

There was data going round, mentioned by Academic Agent, that if only women voted in the UK since WW2, no left wing government would’ve ever gotten into power since. I’d like a video on that. Shan’t hold my breath but if enough people pester him he could trigger some broflakes because the sloth of r-men votes socialism due to lower T, r-women want to work. Americans need to look at data before complaining. Why are no major MGTOW/MRA channels removed from youtube? The plan is anti-white family, duh.

Besides, adopting pure r, we physically could not outnumber them by over-breeding, they’re generations ahead of us. The baby cult cannot flatten r-numbers.

https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/continents-of-the-world-by-total-fertility-rates.html

“The global fertility rate fell from 5.25 children per woman in 1900, to 2.44 children per woman in 2018. The steepest drop in this shift happened in a single decade, from 1970 to 1980.”
When Boomers gave the Pill to unmarried couples
and factories moved overseas.

“The overall decline in fertility rates isn’t expected to end anytime soon, and it’s even expected to fall past 2.1 children per woman, which is known as the “replacement rate”. Any fertility below this rate signals fewer new babies than parents, leading to an eventual population decline.
Experts predict that world fertility will further drop from 2.5 to 1.9 children per woman by 2100. This means that global population growth will slow down or possibly even go negative.”
All socialist/Marx models rely on rising population, that’s why all their policies e.g. Sex Ed, single parent gibs, no criminal punishment for adultery, all have the same outcome. They’re breeding chattel for their pension pot.
Socialists oversee the breeding of their own slaves. Dark, huh?

As Darwin suggested, evolution is a race for life, and until the overseas threats are dealt with, local solutions are null and void. The ship is sinking, stop your enemies from blowing more holes in the boat. K-selection requires a fair i.e. closed system for operation. Globalists hate this because one such system would easily outcompete them. R-types pouring into the same territory exploiting shared resources will starve all Ks.

https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/third-world-countries

Going by the historical definition, nations such as Finland, Sweden, Ireland, and Switzerland were Third World countries. Based on today’s definition, these would not be considered Third World countries. Instead, what many now interpret “Third World” to mean encompasses economically poor and non-industrialized countries, as well as newly industrialized countries.

Peterson is a globalist liar.

Just read the basic DATA, enclosed:

https://oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/884/The_West_and_the_Rest_in_the_International_Economic_Order.html

Pasted for completion, ho ho ho.

The international economic order has changed in the last 40 years and will no doubt go on changing, as leading economist, Angus Maddison, explains.*

In 1962, we usually divided the world into three regions. The advanced capitalist group was then known as the developed world. The second was the “Sino-Soviet bloc”. Countries “in course of development” were the third world. The China-USSR split occurred in the early 1960s; most of the communist regimes collapsed around 1990, and the hostility of the cold war has largely faded away. The income gap between the former communist countries and the advanced capitalist group has become very much wider than it was. For this reason, a tripartite division of the world economy is no longer appropriate.

For rough comparisons, it is now useful to divide the world in two and compare developments in the advanced capitalist group with the aggregate for lower-income countries – designated as the “West” and the “Rest” in our tables. On average, the West increased its income per head fourfold from 1950 to 2001 – a growth rate of 2.8% a year. In the rest of the world there was a threefold increase – a growth rate of 2.2%. In both cases this was much better than earlier performance. From 1820 to 1950, income grew 1.3% a year in the West and 0.6% in the Rest. Though the gap in income level was still increasing, the acceleration in performance was bigger in the Rest.

Population of the West rose by half from 1950 to 2001 (0.8% a year), about the same pace as in 1820-1950. In the Rest, the situation was very different. Population grew by 2.0%, compared with 0.6% in the earlier period. This reflected a major improvement in welfare as mortality declined and life expectation rose from 44 to 65 years in 2001 – much faster than in the West. In the past two decades birth rates have fallen rapidly – a demographic transition which happened earlier in the West.

The West is now a relatively homogeneous group in terms of living standards, growth performance, economic institutions and modes of governance. Over the past five decades there has also been significant convergence in most of these respects. This is not true of the Rest. There are more than 180 countries in this group. They have nearly all increased their income levels significantly since 1950, but the degree of success has varied enormously. Most of Asia is experiencing fast per capita income growth. Most African countries are fairly stagnant. Most Latin American countries found it very difficult to keep a steady trajectory of advance in the 1980s and 1990s. Population growth is fastest in Africa, a good deal slower in Latin America and slower still in Asia. Life expectation and levels of education are lowest in Africa, better in Latin America, and better still in Asia.

Between 1950 and 2001, the Asian group increased per capita income fivefold and narrowed the relative gap between their incomes and the West. In other regions there was no convergence. Latin American income rose more than twofold, in the former command economies of Eastern Europe and the USSR less than twofold and in Africa about two thirds.

The divergence was even more striking in 1990-2001. In this period the Western group increased their income by a fifth, the Asian group by half, Latin America by a sixth, Africa stagnated and in the former communist countries per capita income fell by a quarter. [DS: WHYYYYYYY]

American policy since 1973 has been much more successful than that of Western Europe and Japan in realising potential for income growth. The incidence of unemployment is now about half of that in Western Europe, whereas in 1950–1973 it was usually double the European rate. Labour force participation increased, with employment expanding from 41% of the population in 1973 to 49% in 1998, compared with an average European rise from 42 to 44%. The percentage drop in working hours per person was half of that in Western Europe. These high levels of activity were achieved with a rate of inflation which was generally more modest than in Western Europe.

US policymakers have been less inhibited in operating at high levels of demand than their European counterparts. Having the world’s major reserve currency, and long used to freedom of international capital movements, they generally treated exchange rate fluctuations with benign neglect. The Reagan administration made major tax cuts, and carried out significant measures of deregulation in the expectation that they would provoke a positive supply response that would outweigh potential inflationary consequences. The US operated with more flexible labour markets. Its capital market was better equipped to supply venture funds to innovators. Its economy was as big as Western Europe but much more closely integrated. Demand buoyancy was sustained by a stock market boom in the 1990s.

The United States was a major gainer from the globalisation of international capital markets. In the postwar period until 1988, US foreign assets always exceeded liabilities, but thereafter its net foreign asset position moved from around zero to minus $1.5 trillion (more than 20% of GDP). Thus the rest of the world helped to sustain the long American boom and financed the large US payments deficit.

Future prospects

The table provides a quantification of growth performance of eight major regions of the world economy and some very tentative projections for development up to the year 2015.

The demographic projections are those of the United Nations Population Division, and indicate a continuing decline in the rate of population growth in virtually all parts of the world. Nevertheless there will still be a very striking difference between the advanced capitalist group and Africa. At 0.33% a year it would take 210 years to double population in the first group. In Africa it is likely to happen within 32 years. [forcing all white people to marry would not work]

In making per capita GDP projections, I assumed a continuance of 1990-2001 rates of performance in Western Europe and Japan and a mild slowdown in the USA, where the information technology bubble of the 1990s has burst, and where the capital inflow which financed its trade deficit seems likely to slacken substantially. Aggregate per capita growth in the “West” seems unlikely to slow down very significantly, but combined with the demographic slowdown, it means that aggregate GDP growth would be about 2% a year. This pace would be similar to that in 1913-1950. Growth momentum transmitted by the “West” is likely to be more modest than in 1870-1913 and 1973-2001.

Asia (excluding Japan)

The most buoyant part of the world economy since the early 1970s has been Asia (excluding Japan). These economies have grown faster than those of the West and their buoyancy has been sustained in great part by their own policies. Their weight in the world economy is much larger than any other non-Western region. I assumed that their per capita growth 2001-2015 will be at the same pace as in 1990-2001.

These economies are catching up with the West and are still at a level of development where “opportunities of backwardness” are unlikely to erode. The combination of high investment rates and rapid GDP growth means that their physical capital stock has been growing more rapidly than in other parts of the world. The East Asian economies also have a high ratio of employment to population. This is due to falling fertility and a rising share of population of working age, but also reflects the traditionally high labour mobilisation of multi-cropping rice economies. In all cases which are documented they had high rates of improvement in education and the quality of human capital. Equally striking were the rapid growth of exports, the high ratio of exports to GDP, and a willingness to attract foreign direct investment as a vehicle for assimilation of foreign technology. These characteristics of China, South Korea and Chinese-Taipei have made for super-growth, but there is a second tier of countries whose growth is accelerating rapidly. The most notable case is India which has the potential to join the super-growth club. There are other economies where prospects are more problematic, but these are only a sixth of the Asian total. The projections assume no substantial change in their performance.

Latin America

Latin America is the second largest non-Western region with about 8% of world product and a slightly bigger share of world population. Until the 1970s, economic policy was different from that in the advanced capitalist group. Most countries never seriously tried to observe the fixed rate discipline of Bretton Woods. National currencies were repeatedly devalued, IMF advocacy of fiscal and monetary rectitude was frequently rebuffed, high rates of inflation became endemic. Most countries reacted with insouciance to the worldwide explosion of prices, and governments felt that they could accommodate high rates of inflation. They were able to borrow on a large scale at negative real interest rates to cover external deficits incurred as a result of expansionary policies.

However, the basic parameters had changed by the early 1980s. By then, the OECD countries were pushing anti–inflationary policy very vigorously. The change to restrictive monetary policy initiated by the US Federal Reserve pushed up interest rates suddenly and sharply. Between 1973 and 1982, external debt increased sevenfold and the credit worthiness of Latin America as a whole was grievously damaged by Mexico’s debt delinquency in 1982. The flow of voluntary private lending stopped abruptly, and created a massive need for retrenchment in economies teetering on the edge of hyperinflation and fiscal crisis. In most countries resource allocation was distorted by subsidies, controls, widespread commitments to government enterprise and detailed interventionism. Most of them also had serious social tension, and several had unsavoury political regimes.

In the 1930s, most Latin American countries resorted to debt default, but it was not a very attractive option in the 1980s. World trade had not collapsed, international private lending continued on a large scale. The IMF and World Bank had substantial facilities to mitigate the situation, and leverage to pressure Western banks to make involuntary loans and legitimate a substantial degree of delinquency.

In the 1980s, the attempts to resolve these problems brought major changes in economic policy. But in most countries, changes were made reluctantly. After experiments with heterodox policy options in Argentina and Brazil, most countries eventually embraced the neoliberal policy mix pioneered by Chile. They moved towards greater openness to international markets, reduced government intervention, trade liberalisation, less distorted exchange rates, better fiscal equilibrium and establishment of more democratic political systems.

The cost of this transition was a decade of falling per capita income in the 1980s. After 1990, economic growth revived substantially but the process was interrupted by contagious episodes of capital flight.

My projections for Latin America assume some modest improvement in per capita performance in 2001-2015.

Africa

Africa has nearly 13% of world population, but only 3% of world GDP. It is the world’s poorest region. Its population is growing seven times as fast as in Western Europe. Per capita income in 2001 was below its 1980 peak. African economies are more volatile than most others because export earnings are concentrated on a few primary commodities, and extremes of weather (droughts and floods) are more severe and have a heavy impact.

As a result of rapid growth, little more than half the population is of working age. Almost half are illiterate. They have had a high incidence of infectious and parasitic disease (malaria, sleeping sickness, hookworm, river blindness, yellow fever). Over two thirds of HIV-infected people live in Africa. As a result the quantity and quality of labour input per head of population is much lower than in other parts of the world.

European powers became interested in grabbing Africa in the 1880s. Twenty-two countries eventually emerged from French colonisation, 21 from British, 5 from Portuguese, 3 from Belgian, 2 from Spanish. Germany lost its colonies after the First World War, Italy after the Second. The colonialists created boundaries to suit their own convenience, with little regard to local traditions or ethnicity. European law and property rights were introduced with little regard to traditional forms of land allocation. Hence European colonists often got the best land and most of the benefits from exploitation of mineral rights and plantation agriculture. African incomes were kept low by forced labour or apartheid practices. Little was done to build a transport infrastructure or to cater for popular education.

Colonisation ended between 1956 and 1974. In South Africa, the mass of the population did not get political rights until 1994. Independence brought many serious challenges. The political leadership had to try to create elements of national solidarity and stability more or less from scratch. The new national entities were in most cases a creation of colonial rule. There was great ethnic diversity with no tradition or indigenous institutions of nationhood. The linguistic vehicle of administration and education was generally French, English or Portuguese rather than the languages most used by the mass of the population. Africa became a focus of international rivalry during the cold war. China, the USSR, Cuba and East European countries supplied economic and military aid to new countries viewed as proxies in a worldwide conflict of interest. Western countries, Israel and Chinese-Taipei were more generous in supplying aid and less fastidious in its allocation than they might otherwise have been. As a result, Africa accumulated large external debts which had a meagre developmental pay-off.

There was a great scarcity of people with education or administrative experience. Suddenly these countries had to create a political elite, staff a national bureaucracy, establish a judiciary, create a police force and armed forces, send out dozens of diplomats. The first big wave of job opportunities strengthened the role of patronage and rent-seeking, and reduced the attractions of entrepreneurship. The existing stock of graduates was too thin to meet the demands and there was heavy dependence on foreign personnel.

The process of state creation involved armed struggle in many cases. Many countries have suffered from civil wars and bloody dictators. These wars were a major impediment to development.

In many African states, rulers have sought to keep their positions for life. In most states, rulers relied for support on a narrow group who shared the spoils of office. Corruption became widespread, property rights insecure, business decisions risky.

A major factor in the slowdown since 1980 has been external debt. As the cold war faded from the mid-1980s, foreign aid levelled off, and net lending to Africa fell. Although the flow of foreign direct investment has risen it has not offset the fall in other financial flows

The challenges to development in Africa are greater than in any other continent, the deficiencies in health, education and nutrition the most extreme. It is the continent with the greatest need for financial aid and technical assistance. The per capita GDP projections assume that these kinds of aid will be increased and that per capita growth will be positive. However, it is unlikely that African countries will, by 2015, be able to establish a trajectory of rapid catch-up such as Asian economies have achieved.

Eastern Europe

In Eastern Europe, the economic system was similar to that in the USSR from 1948 to the end of the 1980s, and so was economic performance. In 1950-1973, per capita growth more or less kept pace with that of Western Europe, but faltered badly as the economic and political system began to crumble. From 1973-1990, it grew at 0.5% a year compared with 1.9% in Western Europe.

The transition from a command to a market economy was difficult in all of the countries. The easiest part was freeing prices and opening of trade with the West. This ended shortages and queuing, improved the quality of goods and services and increased consumer welfare. However, much of the old capital stock became junk; the labour force needed to acquire new skills and work habits; the legal and administrative systems and the tax/social benefit structure had to be transformed; the distributive and banking networks to be rebuilt from scratch. The travails of transition led to a fall in average per capita income for the group from 1990 to 1993, but it rose by over 3% a year from then to 2001. My projection assumes that this pace of advance can be maintained at least until 2015. In fact, these countries can probably do better than this if they can be integrated into the European Union with better access to its goods, labour, and capital markets, its regional and other subsidies, than they have thus far enjoyed. Present real income levels are only a third of those in Western Europe. Wages are also much lower, but the disparity in skills is much less. The Eastern economies are therefore capable of mounting a catch-up dynamic similar to that of Asia if the integration takes place.

Successor states of former USSR

Fifteen successor states emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In all of them, there was already a very marked deceleration of economic growth in 1973-1990. There was colossal inefficiency in resource allocation, a very heavy burden of military expenditure and associated spending, depletion and destruction of natural resources.

Capital/output ratios were higher than in capitalist countries. Materials were used wastefully. Shortages created a chronic tendency to hoard inventories. The steel consumption/GDP ratio was four times as high as in the US. The average industrial firm had 814 workers in 1987 compared with 30 in Germany and the UK. Transfer of technology from the West was hindered by trade restrictions, lack of foreign direct investment and very restricted access to foreign technicians and scholars. Work incentives were meagre, malingering on the job was commonplace. [but UBI and pensions will make it better /s]

The quality of consumer goods was poor. Retail outlets and service industries were few. Prices bore little relation to cost. Consumers wasted time queuing, bartering or sometimes bribing their way to the goods and services they wanted. There was an active black market, and special shops for the nomenklatura. There was increasing cynicism, frustration, growing alcoholism and a decline in life expectation. [so like America now?]

Soviet spending on its military and space effort was around 15% of GDP in the 1970s and 1980s, nearly three times the US ratio and five times as high as in Western Europe. There were significant associated commitments to Afghanistan, Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam and Soviet client states in Africa.

In the 1950s a good deal of agricultural expansion was in virgin soil areas, whose fertility was quickly exhausted. Most of the Aral sea was transformed into a salty desert. Exploitation of mineral and energy resources in Siberia and Central Asia required bigger infrastructure costs than in European Russia. The Chernobyl nuclear accident had a disastrously polluting effect on a large area of the Ukraine.

In 1985-1991 Gorbachev established a remarkable degree of political freedom and liberated Eastern Europe but had no coherent economic policy. From then to end 1999, Yeltsin broke up the Soviet Union, destroyed its economic and political system and moved towards a “market” economy. The economic outcome was a downward spiral of real income for the mass of the population. On average, GDP was nearly 30% lower in 2002 in the 15 republics than in 1990. Fixed investment and military spending fell dramatically, so the drop in private consumption was milder. There were very big changes in income distribution. Under the old system, basic necessities (bread, housing, education, health, crèches and social services) had been highly subsidised by the government or provided free by state enterprises to their workers. These all became relatively more expensive, the real value of wages and pensions was reduced by hyperinflation, and the value of popular savings was destroyed. There were major gains in the income of a new oligarchy. [i.e. cancelling Marxism cannot be overnight]

The new “market” economy is grossly inefficient and unfair in allocating resources. There has been legislation to establish Western style property rights, but in practice accountancy is opaque and government interpretation of property rights is arbitrary. Many businesses are subject to criminal pressure. Property owners such as shareholders or investors are uncertain whether their rights will be honoured. Workers are not sure their wages will be paid.

*This article is an adapted extract from Angus Maddison’s chapter, “The West and the Rest in the International Economic Order”, in Development is Back, OECD Development Centre, 2002.

sound familiar?

so why does Peterson hide this info?

The manosphere’s delusion

https://nypost.com/2017/09/02/cheap-sex-is-making-men-give-up-on-marriage/

The wages of sin, the fruits of the Sexual Revolution. Death.

https://www.npr.org/2019/05/15/723518379/u-s-births-fell-to-a-32-year-low-in-2018-cdc-says-birthrate-is-at-record-level

Immigration won’t save you.

Keep telling yourself you’re not responsible.

For pushing the very anti-natal propaganda you recognise ruined the Boomers generally.

No “muh birth rate” kvetching. Especially when many men are 50% responsible for chemical abortions by conceiving with a woman on the Pill. Gametes fuse into a zygote, that’s conception, genetically. A new being conceived.

https://www.diffen.com/difference/Gamete_vs_Zygote

https://www.thefreedictionary.com/conception

. 1. a. Formation of a viable zygote by the union of the male sperm and female ovum; fertilization.

The manosphere is in hard bluepill denial about this. You’ve aborted your own kids if a condom wasn’t used.

https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/2020-04-29/us-marriage-rate-drops-to-record-low

it’s like a bad joke, how do you make white men genocide themselves?

you make sterility a virtue signal

Social and economic shifts in the U.S. are visible through the lens of the country’s marriage rate, measured as the number of marriages per 1,000 people. That rate has fluctuated since the early 1900s, most notably around times of great historical significance, according to the report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

For example, the marriage rate reached 12 per 1,000 in 1929 – the advent of the Great Depression – before falling to 7.9 in 1932. It then began a sporadic but upward climb, reaching an all-time high of 16.4 as the country emerged from World War II in 1946. The marriage rate fluctuated for the most part until the early 1980s, the data shows.

From 1982 to 2009, marriage rates fell fairly steadily, and then hovered around 6.8 to 7 per 1,000 through 2017.

Your anti-natal propaganda is worse than the Great Depression.

and other white men laugh at you, behind your back

from a vasectomy story:

solipsism, it has a name

Should add genetic suicide.

Make corrupting the youth a crime again. It causes literally most of our demographic problems.

re UK, repost for SEO

fertility is economic, including the social/female requirement of marriage first

most births are still best predicted by marriage

https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/characteristics-of-mother-2-in-england-and-wales-2013

UK 2013 data, table 1:

live births WITHIN wedlock, all ages: 

367,618

live births OUT of wedlock, all ages:

330,894

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/marriage-rate-uk-latest-figures-lowest-record-ons-a9464706.html

More America:

https://ifstudies.org/blog/no-ring-no-baby

A large part of the decline in birth rates can be directly accounted for by a factor unlikely to be influenced by those birth-targeted incentives: marriage. That is, most long-run change in fertility can be accounted for by changes in the marital composition of society.

DIRECTLY.

Memorise this chart and imagine me slapping you every time you blame something else.

Essentially all of the decline in fertility since 2001 can be explained by changes in the marital composition of the population.

Married, single, and divorced women are all about as likely, controlling for age and marital status, to have kids now as they were in 2001.

But today, a smaller proportion of women are married during those peak-fertility years.

You all disgust me.

Five minutes of basic research, you basic bitches of redpill.

And the guys who pushed it, you knew about them too. You knew what they were about. No blaming the out-group.

This is amusing.

Yes Roosh, White Nationalists Want to Control Sexual Behavior

Genetic load and no, you’re not entitled to breed.

The low IQ Americans: MUH ANCESTORS
-died. Mostly died. STFU with the snowflaking outrage.

Maths below.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297657116_Mutation_and_Human_Exceptionalism_Our_Future_Genetic_Load

Although the human germline mutation rate is higher than that in any other well-studied species, the rate is not exceptional once the effective genome size and effective population size are taken into consideration. Human somatic mutation rates are substantially elevated above those in the germline, but this is also seen in other species.

What is exceptional about humans is the recent detachment from the challenges of the natural environment and the ability to modify phenotypic traits in ways that mitigate the fitness effects of mutations, e.g., precision and personalized medicine. This results in a relaxation of selection against mildly deleterious mutations, including those magnifying the mutation rate itself.

Actually, it’s anti-selection aka dysgenics. There is always a pressure in some direction, read Darwin?

You can’t have dystopia without dysgenics. That’s all a dystopia is.

The long-term consequence of such effects is an expected genetic deterioration in the baseline human condition,

Non-uniform.

By race and subrace.

potentially measurable on the timescale of a few generations in westernized societies,

Which metrics?

Technically you only need one truly fuck-up generation (say Boomers) to install those social policies up to 3 (living memory). This is without external group effects i.e. invasion on a genetic level, rape. So it isn’t fair to say immigration caused this, it compounds it severely. The Boomers and their outsized ingroup-gene infanticide will go down in history as mass murderers, if there’s anyone left.

and because the brain is a particularly large mutational target, this is of particular concern. Ultimately, the price will have to be covered by further investment in various forms of medical intervention.

Medicine isn’t magic. It cannot do that. We already cannot afford the current population with the present and dwindling useful tax base, let alone Japan levels of old coots living to infinity and China levels of population size.

You can’t fuck your way out of this, r-types. You can’t immigrate it either, those new entries have a lower IQ, higher overall group fertility and represent a smaller usable tax base. Debt doesn’t exist to cover this medical cost, even digital money typing. You can’t even type your way out of it. Hyperinflation would occur first, long before actually. Try running the numbers, see if you’re as smart as me. The cost of quality food is the anchor point. Of all living expenses, that one actually keeps you alive?

Don’t become a doctor, kids. Medicine bubble, heard it here first.

Hell, NHS GPs are already quitting now. Retention will only get worse. The ones who stay have lower IQ and can’t find gainful employment anywhere else. This is how socialism degrades infrastructure, the first generation the NHS seemed fine but the second, it attracted parasites to become GPs for the money and by the third, the original talented ones (by private sector standards) had retired and died, leaving training downhill from there.

Other people have explained that before. That one isn’t me.

Resolving the uncertainties of the magnitude and timescale of these effects will require the establishment of stable, standardized, multigenerational measurement procedures for various human traits.

Measurement? We’re lower IQ than ingroup Victorian ancestors by reaction time.

No action?

No correction?

No control?

No standards?

No relevant barriers to entry? Say, for breeding? At least on state funding?

Shows what they think of the producers, dunnit?

Leave the leech alone! The parasites are fine!

Yeah wait a few generations, maybe a century and hope the metrics are correctly chosen to matter!

Long after the researchers are dead so you can’t kill them for being wrong.

This is Idiocracy, even academia is full of nitwits.

We used to have a breeding license, it’s called a marriage certificate.

Below a certain IQ, you can’t actually consent to get married or breed. Maybe study that first?

No, that would be both logical and responsible.

See, I don’t just sit here bitching. I have solutions but nobody listens.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291734415_Mean_household_size_in_mid-Tudor_Englandclackclose_hundred_Norfolk

cites
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313794802_Mutation_Accumulation_Theory

nb Historians and real scientists say European, liars typically say Caucasian.

For example, among European populations in the year 1600 AD the average individual had around a 25-40 % chance of dying in infancy, a 50 % chance of dying during childhood (Volk and Atkinson 2008), and only around a 40 % chance of fully participating in reproduction (Rühli and Henneberg 2013). The average family size was close to five in 1600s England (Arkell & Whiteman, 1998) -given the high rates of pre- term, infant, and child mortality, the numbers ever conceived would likely have been considerably higher. These historical Western infant and child mortality statistics are similar to those observed in contemporary hunter-gatherer populations (Volk and Atkinson 2008)

I’ll list the maths since there’s always that one idiot who “disagrees”.

Of those born, low ball:

100 – 25% = 75
75 – 50% = 37.5
37.5 – 40% = 15
15 of 100 births eventually reproduced, at best.

Your ancestors in 1600 weren’t entitled to breed either. STFU, stupid sections of America.
Natural selection is important.

RITES OF PASSAGE. TOUGH ONES.

Assuming you aren’t tradlarping?

Bear in mind, that wasn’t sex-specific and those estimates are the population i.e. they have to breed with one another.*

Less conservative estimate:

100 – 40% = 60
60 – 50% = 30
30 – 40% = 12
12 of 100 births eventually reproduced, by academic estimate. The more realistic one.

Again, stop being so entitled. Considering the odds, five kids average is actually pretty low.
The entitled brats, appealing to a tradition that’s totally ignorant and imaginary, are the spiteful mutants. In any other time period, you’d probably be dead by now. Male infant mortality is higher than female overall for humans, which hasn’t been factored in. 

And WWs 1 and 2 culled the bravest genes of that millennia selection by machine gun and sniper.

At least the bankers made mo- wait, they’ve already “run out” of fake money. Less than a century later.

What was it all for?

so

7.5%

or 7.5/100 births eventually reproduced as a couple TOPS

down to, more reasonably

6% of MEN* (or women, maybe**) compared to the grandfather’s generation.

[Father 50% reproduction as male, Grandfather 100% comparison, since all grandfathers would have bred logically.]

or 6/100 births from the total population, coupled.

Assuming 50/50 male/female birth split and flat survival, which doesn’t exist.**

Since breeding requires TWO people, America.

3 generations tops, with a 6% male survival in 1600 Europe.

BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR.

6% by sex.

This doesn’t further subdivide by health, wealth, religion or attractiveness.

If one surviving guy in that 100 births total was infertile or refused marriage, you can kinda see why it was a big deal.

This is why inheritance was always conditional on religion, approved choice of spouse and vitally, children.

If the Boomers wanna do some good, write into your will your kids get nothing unless actively Christian, married, with at least one child with a spouse you approve of. They won’t do it. They’ll complain about no grandkids though. That never gets old.

Non-white births down in America

The sky isn’t falling you fecking idjits.

https://ifstudies.org/blog/baby-bust-fertility-is-declining-the-most-among-minority-women

[Marriage is also a factor. Unmarried women don’t want a baby.
https://ifstudies.org/blog/no-ring-no-baby ]

I am shook. Women don’t wanna be lumbered with the baby of a man who doesn’t care enough to be a husband and father?* They aren’t attracted to feckless manchilds?

Those bitches!

“That’s because the decline in fertility has been far greater among minorities than among non-Hispanic whites”

FEATURE

NOT. A. BUG.

Chart for the lazy people:

Look at the actual data before whining.

That’s called a selection pressure, children.

Men won’t marry? Women won’t breed.

Who wins? [women, their relatives breed]

But the “white” fertility figure is a bit misleading, as it includes most Hispanics, who have historically had much higher birth rates than non-Hispanic whites. Looking at all Hispanics together, these women are missing nearly 19% of the babies that would have been born from 2008-2016, or about 2.2 million births, as their age-adjusted fertility rates have fallen from 2.85 births per woman to just 2.1, and continue to decline. Meanwhile, non-Hispanic fertility has only declined from 1.95 births per woman to 1.72, yielding about 2.3 million missing births. Solidly half of the missing kids over the last decade would have been born to Hispanic mothers, despite the fact that Hispanics only make up about a quarter of fertility-age women.

Thus, in racial or ethnic terms, America’s “Baby Bust” is kinda, sorta, a little bit racist”

Telling them to be breeding sows isn’t?

Hey, what exactly are they claiming these women should do?

Get back in the maternity ward? Pump out future Dem voters?

*If you really “care” (virtue signal) about Western birth rates, Chicken Littles of the internet, ask MGTOW why they’re complaining about the birth rate but not marrying. You don’t get to complain if you’re causing the ‘problem’.

https://www.rt.com/usa/us-white-births-census-613/

https://nypost.com/2017/09/02/cheap-sex-is-making-men-give-up-on-marriage/

A problem you cause is a CHOICE.

[GDP will go up in a generation with fewer lower IQ drains on its system.]

Other data article:

For the lazy:

“That is, most long-run change in fertility can be accounted for by changes in the marital composition of society.”

Marital status is a key determinant of whether or not women have as many kids as they want.”

HALF OR MORE.

Meanwhile, student loans must be written off if you care about IQ.

“It’s possible that debt may also reduce fertility, independently of marriage. Some studies do show that student debt has a strong effect on delaying fertility. The economic rationale is simple: having and raising children costs money, and student debt gobbles up a share of income right off the top of the budget. Crucially, even income-based repayment doesn’t fix this, as it resets with higher incomes: a debtor can’t earn their way out. As income rises, so do debt payments. At some high threshold, of course, the debtor can exceed the required payments and can advance the date of final repayment, but the point is that student loans, no matter how they are structured, divert money that might have gone towards planning for a child. It’s even possible that student loans delay marriage because they cause debtors to change their childbearing anticipations: maybe debtors realize they won’t be able to afford a child for a long time, and so they postpone marriage until they are (financially) ready for a child.”

Men can’t afford to marry, have kids unless loans are much lower.

Loan control would be a conservative policy, boosting high IQ fertility.

More babies being born are born to high IQ, educated parents.

Again, actual data.

“Finances, and student debt, specifically, aren’t the only reason for delayed marriage. Most unmarried people who want to get married say either that they are too young and unready for marriage, or else they haven’t found the right person. It may be that part of the problem is the decline in “marriageable men.” At the metro area level, the imbalance in sex ratios can sometimes be enormous.”

“The simple fact of the matter is that marital status is a key determinant of whether or not women have as many kids as they want.”

ACTUAL. DATA.

Women want to have kids, it’s the mens’ fault.

“Combined, it turns out that a combination of marital status, age, and fertility ideals is a pretty good predictor of individual-level fertility. In other words, marital status serves as a circuit-breaker on fertility aims: married people get close to achieving their aims, while never-married people generally don’t.”
“But one vital driver of birth rates is marriage. And as long as the average age of first marriage rises and the number of prime childbearing years the average woman spends married falls, we can expect to see fertility linger at low levels. Therefore, any policy supporting childbirth—however generous it may be—that does not also somehow impact marriage trends is unlikely to boost long-term fertility.”

It isn’t women’s fault they won’t man up.

The data is loud and clear.

White bachelor men are cucking themselves.

Birth rates and Western culture

I don’t think I linked to these.

Malthus and the Making of the Modern World

Click to access Malthus_final.pdf

On the characteristic individualism of Western cultures.

Click to access 82p171.pdf

“Weber suggested that one of the central causes of the emergence of capitalism and its associated features was the disappearance of extended family structures. … ‘freeing’ the market and the individual.

The individual didn’t exist beforehand.

It’s a common question so here you go, either you can read it or stop circling the same three questions like clueless vultures.

1.How did we get here? – Libertarians who thought they could share without loss.

2.What’s going on with our demography? – r/K but read Malthus first aka Who is alive and why?

3.Why are we different? – Individualism opposes collectivism (non-Europeans) and those differences are irreconcilable, because they are genetic.

pp.122

Nationalism must come before any capitalistic position or you lose all your resources to the outgroup. You must be fair on your own citizens or no good will come of it.

UK population reaches 64 million thanks to immigration

http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/485085/UK-population-has-soared

And we’re only voicing concern over public services now??

This is a tiny island, such developments are impossible. And the insinuation everyone is entitled to our services is absurd (and true in practice). Doesn’t count illegals either. Who wants to place bets on deportation, incentives and restriction of access? If these systems are to continue, it is inevitable.