The COVID-19 pandemic and human fertility
A picture emerges.
Published in Science. Yesterday.
Why study that? Why associate the two in our minds?
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic will have consequences for human populations. Worldwide, mortality levels are certainly affected. The worst-hit northern Italian provinces recorded losses of period life expectancy of 2 to 3.5 years for men and 1.1. to 2.5 years for women, the largest decline in life expectancy since the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic and World War II (1). Similar patterns follow in other countries (2). With the focus firmly on deaths, the scientific debate risks overlooking that population dynamics are also shaped by fertility trajectories. Throughout history, spikes in mortality owing to events such as wars, famines, and pandemics were followed by changes in fertility, resulting in fewer births in the short term and by recuperation in subsequent years (3).
so they’re blaming the nothing-burger ALREADY – for what the vaccine’s gonna do
obscure 1998 paper  does not make weak appeal to “history” relevant now
a mild historical trend refers to r-type die-off to a large degree, covered in AC’s r/k book (link here) and so greater K-selection in remaining breeding population, who were more in-group oriented and cautious – simple really
Economic and social change triggered by a pandemic
is also likely to influence childbearing intentions and completed fertility. How the COVID-19 pandemic will affect fertility has implications for the rate of population aging, shaping future health challenges and economic growth potential across the globe.
Drivers of these medium-term rebounds are the desire of parents to replace lost children, as well as structural shifts in expectations on the survival probability of offspring. In the wake of unexpected mortality shocks, fertility may also take on a symbolic meaning, as new births become a positive reframing mechanism, signaling a return to normality.
by K-types, for K-selection again
forgive my shitty graphic
Channels for adverse fertility effects include the increased mortality and morbidity of adults in reproductive age;
higher frequency of maternal mortality and stillbirths;
and slowdowns in conceptions, owing to fear of infections and decreased social mixing.
They always half-explain.
K-selection. War swiftly follows a decade or two later because banks are bloodthirsty. Can’t let Ks reign, culturally, might cancel them.
Europe needs an attractiveness and high IQ sperm bank in case of war.
A relationship between excess influenza deaths and a 9-month lagged depression in births was observed by Jacques Bertillon in seminal studies on the impact of the 1889 influenza outbreak on the population of France (5).
1914-1889 = 25 years
On this basis alone, one might conclude that setbacks in development, owing to negative life expectancy and income shocks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, will lift fertility in countries scoring below 0.85 to 0.9 in the Human Development Index but reduce fertility in highly developed countries. Increased fertility in the developing world would maintain high population growth, aggravating challenges in food production, unemployment, poverty, and public health, thus hampering economic growth and pushing back the onset of the demographic dividend. A further fertility fall in high-income countries would accelerate population aging and population decline, both of which are major policy concerns.
In high-income countries, expansion in women’s education has been one of the most powerful drivers behind the sustained fertility decline of recent decades.
It’s actually delayed marriage.
Marriage is just usually delayed to meet a spouse at college v. church in earlier generations.
The manosphere keeps getting this wrong.
Here, fertility is maintained through extensive outsourcing of childcare.
Due to Third World labour competition suppressing domestic wages, have done since the floodgates opened.
Women have worked since always so that isn’t it.
During the current pandemic, however, prolonged school closures and mandated physical distancing have caused an immediate return to childcare within the home. In as much as this imposes a heavier burden on parents’ time, the lockdown will result in lower desired fertility and childbearing postponements in the short term.
being a parent? yeah, you made it, you raise it
damn parental entitlement
Subsequent fertility will also be affected by the ways in which parents and couples share the additional time devoted to childcare and housework during the lockdown. Greater gender equity in the division of domestic labor would reduce the burden on women and have beneficial fertility implications (10, 11). The lockdown will, however, have other immediate effects on fertility. Given high maternal age in high-income countries, assisted reproductive technology (ART) is essential for many parents who want children. During the lockdown, most ART cycles were suspended or canceled altogether. The eventual reopening of fertility clinics will not easily offset lost cycles.
Nope, most white women don’t use those.
The shutdowns are resulting in large economic losses. With high-income countries set to experience the steepest fall (−6.1% in 2020 according to the International Monetary Fund, versus −1% for developing economies), millions of households will be affected. Given the irreversible nature of childbearing and the substantial costs associated with child-rearing, unemployment and lost income will necessarily reduce fertility. This was the experience of the 2008 Great Recession, when overall fertility declined, particularly in countries that had the strongest economic downturns (12). In addition, a stronger feeling of uncertainty will make couples postpone any long-term investments—children being prime examples—and therefore reduce fertility further. Coping mechanisms for dealing with uncertainty will consequently matter. There is evidence that, in periods with unexpected increases in economic uncertainty, fertility declines less in areas characterized by stronger trust and social capital (13).
so NOT multiculturalism
fertility is economic, including the social/female requirement of marriage first
most births are still best predicted by marriage
UK 2013 data, table 1:
live births WITHIN wedlock, all ages:
live births OUT of wedlock, all ages:
In low- and middle-income countries, as the economy relapses, the question is whether fertility will start to rise again, thereby reversing recent decades of fertility decline. In the demographic literature, there are two main economic explanations for high fertility. One is that poverty increases the benefits of unpaid child labor in the family while bringing down the life-long value of investment in education. The other is that high fertility offers a form of security for parents in their old age (14). However, socioeconomic development and increased rural-to-urban migration over the past decades cut the percentage of people living in rural areas to less than half. These structural changes have altered the opportunity costs of childbearing, leading to smaller-family ideals as well as greater legitimacy for modern contraception and wider accessibility to the same. Urban dwellers in large cities are more directly exposed to economic downturns: Rising unemployment and underemployment are already leading to migratory displacement and decreased purchasing power, with adverse implications for childbearing. The COVID-19 pandemic also forced family-planning centers to temporarily close or reduce their activities. The short-term effect of lost access to contraception may include an increase in unwanted pregnancies, with adverse health implications for mothers and children, as seen in the recent West African Ebola crisis (15).
Certainly, policy responses will play a central role, by determining not only the scope of the pandemic itself, but also its social and economic fallout. In contrast to the 2008 economic recession, there is, this time around, a consensus that austerity is not the answer. Yet, given the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic, fertility decline seems likely, at least in high-income countries and in the short term. In low- and middle-income countries, the fertility decline observed in recent decades is unlikely to be fundamentally reversed by the pandemic. In contrast to transition economies, most sub-Saharan African countries are lagging behind in the demographic transition. Despite prospects of economic hardship and poverty, ongoing structural change will make a reversal to high fertility unlikely. For these countries, trends in international coordination and protectionism will be a key determinant for the revival of their export-led economies, thus affecting, directly and indirectly, the world’s demographics for years to come.
demand to see the ingredients lists people, I’d wager you’ll see antifertility agents
BMJ, 2018: EU suddenly concerned public is refusing consent for vaccines.